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KANSAS WHEAT  PRODUCER
Alan E. States
Growing  wheat  in Kansas,  as I  do,  is  a long  way  from the Canadian
border.  As  a result of geographic  separation,  maybe I can be a little more  ob-
jective about the trade issues involved in U.S. imports of wheat and durum than
growers  close to the border. My objective  is to be controversial  enough to give
you pause the next time you listen to the  details of some trade dispute.
The  North American  Free  Trade Agreement  expresses  a philosophy
that the inhabitants  of the continent will be better off with free  and open trade
among  its citizens,  than  they would be by maintaining trade  barriers.  We  are
here today to report on the progress of that grand endeavor. In general, we may
be living  up to  the terms  of the  agreement but we  have  a long  way to  go to
accomplish the mission.  Just as the Articles of Confederation  were replaced by
the Constitution, the NAFTA needs to be improved.
Free  trade can be compared to a three-legged stool.  If any of the legs
break the stool falls over. A good trade agreement also has three legs to hold it
up: if any of these  legs are weak the agreement  will fail:
* the first is elimination  of tariff barriers;
* the second is elimination  of non-tariff barriers;
* the third is elimination  of trade distorting  incentives to produce.
The first leg, the elimination tariff barriers,  is the easiest to construct.
Tariffs  are visible and can be phased  out over time. The  second leg, non-tariff
barriers,  is tougher.  These barriers may be import quotas. However  quotas can
be changed to tariffs and then phased out. More often non-tariff barriers come
in other forms and are easier to hide or rationalize.  They may come disguised
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The third leg,  elimination of trade-distorting  incentives  to produce,  is
also difficult  to  handle.  These  incentives  are  usually domestic  programs  in
support of the income  of local producers.  They come in many forms.
For example,  product specific  transportation  subsidies  or preferences
translate  into higher local  prices  for producers.  Producers  are  encouraged  to
produce  more, which usually results in  lower prices  both for themselves  and
their competitors around the world.  Product specific tax preferences  work the
same  way.  Similarly  subsidized  carrying  costs, either  in the  form of storage
subsidies  or low interest loans,  also translate into higher income and increased
incentives  to produce.  Marketing loans are  also highly trade distorting for the
same  reasons, as  are price support loans, intervention prices, export  subsidies
and area payments that are coupled to plantings.
Effective state trading organizations may also be trade distorting to the
extent  that  they  may  hide  state  subsidies  in  the form  of low  cost  operating
funds, have inordinate powers to distort freight rates, and restrict domestic sup-
ply to local consumers.
Of course  the grass  is always  greener in the other side of the hill. We
need to be cognizant to the danger that we may get what we are asking for. The
United States fought for the elimination of subsidized freight rates in Canada.
Termination of  that subsidy  led to restoration of the natural flow of grains to
the south rather than to the far west.
The Canadian Wheat Board is doing a disservice to the better farmers
in Canada, many who would be better off if they had free trade within their own
country. The CWB wants monopoly powers to shield itself from more efficient
domestic competition.  While the CWB is a trade irritant, the elimination of its
monopoly powers could be a nightmare-come-true  for U.S. producers. Why is
that? It is because Canadian wheat farmers may be more competitive than their
U.S. counterparts.  Farmers in the States have been telling themselves for years
that  they  are the  most efficient  wheat producers  in  the  world.  That may  no
longer be true. Australia, Argentina as well as Canada may have lower costs of
production than the United States. That is the case because the U.S. Farm Pro-
gram,  with its marketing  loan,  supports  income, which  in turn  is capitalized
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into  the  price of land,  ultimately drives  production  costs higher  making U.S.
producers  non competitive.  U.S. farmland prices have been surprisingly strong
in the face of low market prices.
This  capitalization  is also expressed  even  more blatantly  in  Europe
where  area payments, intervention prices  and export subsidies  support the in-
come of European producers and are capitalized into land prices which clearly
make the European farmer non competitive and dependant on the welfare state
and the VAT.  The  fact that the EU's area  payments  are  in the WTO blue  box
rather than  the  amber  box  says  more  about  the Europeans  negotiating  skills
than economic reality.
Income and  tax  subsidies  can  only  be trade  neutral  when they come
completely  de-coupled  from  plantings and production.  Distorting  trade prac-
tices are counter-productive.  Let me explain.
Wheat is a commodity just like a personal computer. Every year some-
one can make a computer better, faster and cheaper than before. The same holds
true  with  wheat.  In  real  terms,  commodity  prices  tend to  decline  over  time.
This  is  what gives us all a higher living  standard. This  is a piece of the Great
American Dream.  When trade groups,  whether they represent wheat,  textiles
or dock workers,  fail to recognize this and are also powerful enough to impose
protectionist measures  to aid their constituents,  they are being penny wise and
pound foolish.  Rather than encouraging  their industry to adapt to change as it
occurs,  they protect  it from change until the change  is overwhelming  and can
no longer be held back. Then the dam bursts and the domestic industry is swept
away  in the  flood  that  follows.  While  the  distorting  trade  practices  were  in
effect,  the domestic consumers  paid a higher price than needed, they also may
have paid higher taxes to support the cost of the program and foreign competi-
tors  were  damaged.  The  protected  party ultimately  was harmed  because  the
protection  from competition  made  him even  less  competitive  and  ultimately
less able  to survive  in the long run. We  have  seen this happen time and again
when great nations such as China and Japan turned inward and were bypassed
by the rest of the world.
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The Internet was not a factor when NAFTA was signed.  The world has
changed dramatically  in the short period since  1995. The CAP of the EU, U.S.
price  support programs  and the monopoly powers  of the CWB are  dinosaurs
whose time has come and gone. Let them die gracefully.
The  existence  of these holdovers  from the  past may  be  allowed  be-
cause they are within the letter of the NAFTA and WTO agreements.  But their
continued existence indicates that we have not yet accomplished the mission of
open markets. That will only occur when a Canadian wheat farmer can sell his
product to the highest bidder whether it be a local miller, an elevator in Fargo,
or the CWB, and when a North Dakota grower can deliver wheat to a Canadian
processor with  same ease  as  going to his local  elevator.  As well,  it will  only
occur when  these  producers receive  prices  which  are  genuinely reflective  of
market based demand and supply in the major producing and consuming coun-
tries.